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HEARSAY: PART IV
Paul C. Giannelli

Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
This is the fourth in a series of articles on the hearsay
rule. It examines the hearsay exceptions in Ohio Rule of
Evidence 804, exceptions which require the unavailability of the declarant to be established as a condition for
admissability. Rule 805, which governs double hearsay,
and Rule 806, which regulates the impeachment of hearsay declarants, are also discussed.
FORMER TESTIMONY
Rule 804(8)(1) recognizes a hearsay exception for
former testimony. The rule provides for admissibility (1) of
the testimony of a witness at another hearing or deposition;
(2) if the party against whom the testimony is offered, or a
predecessor in interest in a civil case, had an opportunity
and similar motive to develop the testimony of the
witness by direct, cross, or redirect examination; and (3)
the witness is unavailable under Rule 804(A). The former
testimony of a party is admissil:)le against that party as
admission of a party-opponent. See Rule 801 (D)(2)(a).
Rule 804(8)(1) supersedes RC 2945.49 (criminal cases)
and 2317.06 (civil cases).
In contrast to other hearsay exceptions, the former
testimony exception is not based on any circumstantial
guarantee of trustworthiness that is considered an
adequate substitute for cross-examination. The Advisory
Committee's Note to Federal Rule 804 comments:
Former testimony does not rely upon some set of
circumstances to substitute for oath and crossexamination, since both oath and opportunity to crossexamine were present in fact. The only missing .one of
the ideal conditions for the giving of testimony is the
presence of trier and opponent ("demeanor evidence").
This is lacking with all hearsay exceptions. Hence it
may be argued that former testimony is the strongest
hearsay and shold be included under Rule 803 supra.
However, opportunity to observe demeanor is what in a
large measure confers depth and meaning upon oath
and cross-examination. Thus in cases under Rule 803
demeanor lacks the significance which it possesses
with respect to testimony. In any event, the tradition,
founded in experience, uniformly favors production of
the witness if he is available. The exception indicates
continuation of the policy. This preference for the

presence of the witness is apparent also in rules and
statutes on the use of depositions, which deal with
substantially the same problem.
Type of testimony
The rule provides for the admissibility of testimony
given "at another hearing of the same or a different
proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance
with law in the course of the same or another proceeding." Depositions are governed by Grim. R. 15 and Juv.
R. 25. See generally 2 Schroeder-Katz, Ohio Criminal
Law, Grim. R. 15. See also RC 2945.50 and 2945.51
(depositions in criminal cases).
As originally adopted, Rule 804(8)(1) excluded
preliminary hearing testimony from the former testimony exception. See 62 Ohio St.2d xlvii (1980). The exclusion of preliminary hearing testimony was based upon
the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in State v. Roberts,
55 Ohio St.2d 191,378 N.E.2d 492 (1978). The Court in
Roberts held that admitting preliminary hearing
testimony in a criminal trial violated the accused's
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. See also State
v. Smith, 58 Ohio St.2d 344, 390 N.E.2d 778 (1979),
vacated, 448 U.S. 902 (1980). Just days before the
Rules of Evidence became effective, the Roberts decision was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court. See
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
In response, the rule was amended by deleting the
clause which exempted preliminary hearing testimony.
See 53 Ohio Bar 1218 (1980). The deletion of this
clause means that preliminary hearing testimony is
admissible under the former testimony exception. It
should be noted, however, that admitting preliminary
hearing testimony in a criminal trial still raises confrontation issues. Although the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that admitting the preliminary hearing testimony in
Ohio v. Roberts was not error, the Court did not hold
that the admission of preliminary hearing testimony
will always be beyond constitutional attack. Hence the
inclusion of preliminary hearing testimony within the
former testimony exception changes the evidentiary,
but not the constitutional, analysis.
In addition to deposition and preliminary hearing
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testimony, former testirnOflY inclui:Jestestimony given at
a prior trial. See State v. Jester, 32 Ohio St.3d 147, 153,
512 N.E.2d 962 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1047 (1988);
~heets v. Hodes, 142 Ohio St. 559, 53 N.E.2d 804 (1944);
Summons v. State, 5 Ohio St. 559, 325 (1856); Bauer v.
Pullman Co., 15 Ohio App.2d 69,239 N.E.2d 226 (1968);
Lehman v. Haynam, 104 Ohio App. 198, 147 N.E.2d 870
(1957). It also includes testimony given at any proceeding
at which a witness testifies under oath. E.g., Cupps v.
Toledo, 18 Ohio App. 127, 193 N.E.2d 543 (1960), affirmed
by, 172 Ohio St. 536, 179 N.E.2d 70 (1961) (testimony
given before Industrial Commission admitted). Finally,
grand jury testimony may be admitted against the
government. United States v. Henry, 448 F. Supp. 819,
821 (D.N.J. 1978).
·-

witness was the equivalent of what would now be do
if the opportunity were presented. Modern decisions
reduce the requirement to "substantial" identity.
McCormick§ 233. Since identity of issues is significi
only in that it bears on motive and interest in developi
fully the testimony of the witness, expressing the
matter in the latter terms is preferable. ld . ..
The rule does not require "identity of parties." See
McCormick, Evidence§ 256 (3d ed. 1984). As lOng as t
party against whom the former testimony is offered (or
predecessor in interest) had an opportunity to examine
the witness at the former hearing, the rule is satisfied.
This represents a change in Ohio law. RC 2317.06 pern
ted the admission of former testimony evidence only in
"a further trial of the case." See Lord v. Boschert, 47 01
App. 54, 189 N.E. 863 (1934) (requiring identity of partie
As proposed by the U.S. Supreme Court, Federal Ru
804(b)(1) also would have permitted admission of formt
testimony if the witness had been examined at a prior
hearing by a person "with motive and interest similar t<
those of the party against whom [the testimony] is now
offered." 56 F. A.D. 321 (1973). This fortnulg~ion of tl)e n
was rejected by Congress. The House Judiciary Caminiti
explained its amendment to the Court's rule as follows:
Rule 804(b)(1) submitted by the Court allowed prio
testimony of an unavailable witness to be admissible
the party against whom it is offered or a person 'with
motive and interest similar' to his had an opportunity
examine the witness. The Committee considered th<
it is generally unfair to impose upon the party agains
whom the hearsay evidence is being offered respon:
bility for the manner in which the witness was previously handled by another party. The sole exception t
this, in the Committee's view, is when a party's
predecessor in interest in a civil action or proceedin~
had an opportunity and similar notice to examine the
witness. The Committee amended the rule to reflect
these policy determinations. H.R. Rep. No. 650, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code
Gong. & Ad. News 7075, 7088.
The following example illustrates how the rule operates. Assume that defendant injures A and B in an acci
dent. In the first trial A sues defendant, and witness X
testifies. X dies prior to the second trial, in which B sue
defendant. X's testimony at the first trial is admissible i
the second trial against defendant because he had an
opportunity to develop the testimony of X on direct,
cross, or redirect examination. X's testimony, however,
not admissible against B, even though A and B had a
similar motive and interest, because B had no opportUI
ty to examine X.
The above interpretation of the rule, however, is not
beyond challenge. The leading federal case on the isst
adopted an expansive view of what constitutes a "pred
cesser in interest"- a "party having like motive to deve
the same testimony about the same material facts, is, i
the final analysis, a predecessor in interest to the presE
party." Lloyd v. American Export Lines, Inc., 580 F.2d
1179, 1187 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 969 (1978). S
McCormick, Evidence§ 256, at 766 (3d ed. 1984).
It should be noted that the rule requires only that the
"opportunity" to develop the testimony by direct, cross
or redirect examination have been provided at the forrr

Similar motive to examine
The rule provides that former testimony is admissible
only "if the party against whom the testimony is now
offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor
in interest, had anopportunity and similar notice to
develop the testimony by direct; c:ross, or redirect examination." The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule
804 contains the following commentary:
Under the exception, the testimony may be offered (1)
against the party against whom it was previously
offered or (2) against the party by whom it was previously offered. In each instance the question resolves
itself into whether fairness allows imposing, upon the
party against whom now offered, the handling of the
witness on the earlier occasion._(1) If the party against
whom now offered is the one against whom the
testimony w~soff~r13d previol1sly, no unfairness is
apparent in requiring him to accept his own prior
conduct of cross"examination or _decision not to crossexamine. Only demeanor has been lost, and that is
inherent in the situation. (2) If the party against whom
now offered is the one by whom the testimony was
offered previously, a satisfactory ariswer becomes
somewhat more difficult. One possibility is to proceed
somewhat along the line of an a,doptive admission, i.e.
by offering the testimony proponent in effect adopts it.
However, this theory savors of discarded concepts of
witnesses' belonging to a party, of litigants' ability to
pick and choose witnesses, and of vouching for one's
own witnesses. Cf. McCormick, § 246, pp. 526-527; 4
Wigmore§ 1075. A more qirl;lct and acceptable
approach is simply to recognize direct and redirect
examination atone's own witness as the equivalent of
cross-examining an opponent's witness. Falkner,
Former Testimony and the Uniform Rules: A Comment
38 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 651, n. 1 (1963); McCormick§ 231, p.
483. See also 5 Wigmore§ 1389. Allowable techniques
for dealing with hostile, double-crossing, forgetful, and
mentally deficientwitnesses leave no substance to a
claim that one could not adequately develop his own
witness at the former hearing. An even less appealing
argumentis presented when failure to develop fully
was the result of a deliberate choice.
The common law did not limit the admissibility of
former testimony to that given in an earlier trial of the
same case, although it did require identity of issues as
a means of insuring that the former handling of the

2

c::>:_,,

y;)
'

specified in Rule 804(A) suffices.
The exception for dying declarations is based on
necessity- the unavailability of the declarant- and on
a circumstaritia] guarantee of trustworthiness. Dying
declarations "are made in extremity, when the party is at
the point of death, and when every hope of this world is
gone; when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and
the mind is induced, by the most powerful considerations, to speak the truth; a situation so solemn, and so
awful, is considered by the law as creating an obligation
equal to that which is imposed by a positive oath
administered in a court of justice." Rex v. Woodcock, 1
Leach 500,502, 168 Eng. Rep. 352,353 (K.B. 1789},
quoted in State v. Kindle, 47 Ohio St. 358, 365,24 N.E.
485,488 (1890).

hearing. "Actual cross-examination, of course, is not
essential, if the opportunity was afforded and waived."
McCormick, Evidence § 255, at 761 (3d ed. 1984). See
also State v. Jester, 32 Ohio St.3d 147, 153, 512 N.E.2d
962 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1047 (1988}; 5
Wigmore, Evidence§ 1371 (Chadbourn rev. 1974}.

Method of proof
The rule does not specify acceptable methods of proving former testimony. RC 2945.49 contains the following
provisions on the method of proof in criminal case: "If
such former testimony is contained within an authenticated transcript of such testimony, it shall be proven by the
transcript, otherwise by other testimony." RC 2317.06
contains comparable provisions for civfl cases.
A transcript of the former proceeding is the typical and
preferable method of proof. See Rule 803(8) (hearsay
exception for public records}. Former testimony also may
be proved by the testimony of a witness who was present
at the time the testimony was given. See Wagers v. Dickey,
17 Ohio 439 (1848). In Summons v. State, 5 Ohio St. 325
(1856}, the Supreme Court outlined the following requirements:
It is essential to the competency of the witness called
to give this kind of evidence, first, that he heard the
deceased person testify on the former trial; and second,
that he has such accurate recollection of the matter
stated, that he will, on his oath, assume or undertake to
narrate in substance the matter sworn to by the deceased
person, in all its material parts, or that part thereof
which he may be called on to prove /d. (syllabus}.
See McCormick, Evidence§ 260 (3d. ed. 1984}. The
testimony of a witness should be used as a method of
proof only if a transcript is not available. The court has
the authority pursuant to Rule 611(A} to require a transcript be used if one is available.

Imminent expectation of death
The rule provides that the statement must be "made
by a declarant while believing that his death was imminent." This requirement follows from the theory underlying the exception; a declarant who does not believe that
death is near may not feel compelled to speak truthfully.
In Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933), Justice
Cardozo described this requirement:
To make out a dying declaration the declarant must
have spoken without hope of recovery and in the shadow of impending death ...

...There must be a 'settled hopeless expectation'...
that death is near at hand, and what is said must have
been so spoken in the hush of its impending presence ... What is decisive is the state of mind. Even so,
the state of mind must be exhibited in the evidence,
and not left to conjecture. The [declarant) must have
spoken with the consciousness of a swift and certain
doom.ld. at 99-100.
See a/so State v. Kindle, 47 Ohio St. 358, 24 N.E. 485
(1890) (statement of declarant "made in extremis, while
conscious of his condition and under a sense of impending dissolution"); Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio St. 131, 163
(1857} (statement "made under a sense of impending
death, excluding from the mind of the dying person a//
hope or expectation ofrecovery"); State v. Woods, 47
Ohio App.2d 144,352 N.E.2d 598 (1972}.
The declarant's belief of impending death may be
established by the declarant's own statements. In addition, it may be established "circumstantially by the
apparent fatal quality of the wound, by the statements
made to the declarant by the doctor or by others that his
condition is hopeless, and by other circumstances."
McCormick, Evidence§ 282, at 829 (3d ed. 1984). See
also State v. Knight, 20 Ohio App.3d 289, 485 N.E.2d
1064 (1984) ('[l]mmediately before he made the statement, police told him that he did not have long to live.");
State v. Kotowicz, 55 Ohio App. 497,9 N.E.2d 1003
(1937); Shinkman v. State, 7 Ohio L. Abs. 518 (App. 1929).

DYING DECLARATIONS
Rule 804(8) (2) recognizes a hearsay exception for
dying declarations. The rule requires that: (1)the statement
be made while the declarant believed his death was imminent; (2) the statement concern the "cause or circumstances
of what [the declarant] believed to be his impending
death"; (3) the declarant be unavailable (see Rule
804(A}}; and (4) the statement was based on the firsthand
knowledge of the declarant. See Advisory Committee's
Note, Fed. R. Evid 804 ("continuation of a requirement of
firsthand knowledge is assured by Rule 602").
The rule is identical to Federal Rule 804(b)(2} except
for technical differences. The rule changes prior Ohio
law in two respects. First, at common law, dying declarations were admissible only in homicide cases. See State
v. Harper, 35 Ohio St. 78 (1878}; Mitchell v. New York Life
Insurance Co., 62 Ohio App. 54, 22 N.E.2d 998 (1939),
reversed on other grounds, 136 Ohio St. 551,27 N.E.2d
243 (1940); McCoy v.lndustrial Comm., 58 Ohio L. Abs.
513, 97 N.E.2d 93 (App. 1950}. Under the rule, dying
declarations are admissible in civil actions as well. Dying
declarations, however, remain inadmissible in criminal
trials other than homicide cases. Second, in contrast to
the common law, admissibility is not conditioned on the
declarant's death. Any of the conditions of unavailability

Subject matter requirement
The rule limits.the type of statements that are admissible under this exception to those "concerning the cause
or circumstances of what [the declarant] believed to be
3

his impending death." Statements identifying the
assailant who caused the injury are included, as are
statements describing the events leading up to the injury.
See McCormick, Evidence§ 283 (3d ed. 1984); 5 Wigmore,
Evidence§ 1434, at 282 (Chadbourn rev 1974) ("facts
leading up to or causing or attending the injurious act").

tions against social interest, that is, a statement making
the declarant "an object of hatred, ridicule, or disgrace."
56 F.R.D. 321 (1973). This provision was rejected by
Congress and was not incorporated in the Ohio rule.
The Staff Note contains the following comment: "The
exceptions to the hearsay rule subjecting declarant to
civil or criminal liability broaden the traditional law
governing declarations against interest and broaden
Ohic;>law as well, the Ohio law having been limited to
declarations against pecuniary interest." This comment,
however, does not accurately reflect prior.Ohio law; In
G.M. McKelvey Co. v. General Casualty Go., 166 Ohio St.
401, 142 N.E.2d 854 (1957), the Supreme Court held .
declarations against "pecuniary or proprietary interest"
admissible. The case involved statements concerning
embezzlement by the declarants. The Court interpreted
"pecuniary interest" expansively to include statements
which would subject the declarants to civil liability: ''Ii]t
was clearly notto their interest to state such facts, since
such declarations render them civilly liable for the
amounts of their defalcations." lcj. at 405. Moreover, in
State v. Williams, 43 Ohio St.2d 88, 330 N.E.2d 891
(1975), the Supreme Court appeared to recognize the
admissibility of declarations against penal interests.

Opinion rule
Some courts have excluded dying declarations as
violative of the opinion rule. See McCormick, Evidence §
285 (3d ed: 1984). In Wroe v. State, 20 Ohio St. 460
(1870), the defendant objected to the admission of the
dying declaration ofa victim who stated, "it was done
without any provocation," on the grounds that the statement expressed a "mere matter of opinion." The
Supreme Court held: "Whether there was provocation or
not, is a fact, not stated, it is true, in the most elementary
form of which it is susceptible, but sufficiently so to be
admissible as evidence." ld at 469. The result in Wroe is
correct. As McCormick notes, the opinion rule "is entirely
inappropriate as a restriction upon out-of-court declarations." McCormick, Evidence§ 285, at 832 (3ded. 1984).
See also Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R~ Evid 804
("Any problem as to dec.larations phrased in terms of
opinion is laid at rest by Rule 701.").

Other Ohio cases on declarations against interest,
which were decided prior to the adoption ofthe Rules of
Evidence, include: Latham v. Clark, 120 Ohio St. 559, 166
N.E: 685 (1929}; Ferrebee v. Boggs, 24 Ohio App.2d 18,
263 N.E.2d 574 (1970); 67 Corp v. Elias, 3 Ohio App.2d
411, 210 N.E.2d 734 (1965); Fox v. McCreary, 103 Ohio
App. 73, 144 N.E.2d 546 (1957); Massachusetts Bonding ~
& Insurance Co. v. Cleveland, 91 Ohio L. Abs. 569, 187
'
N.E.2d 369 (App. 1963). See generally Note, Admissions
"Against Interest" in Ohio, 15 Ohio St. L.J. 187 (1954).

STATEMENTS AGAINST INTEREST
Rule 804(B)(3) recognizes a hearsay exception for
statements against interest. Such statements are admissible if (1) they are based on firsthand knowledge, (2) they
are against the declarant's pecuniary, proprietary, penal,
or cjyjl}ial::lilityioterest at the time made, and (3) the
declarant is unavailable, see Rule 804(A). Statements of
parties are admissible as admissions of party-opponents
under Rule 801(0)(2).
··
The exception for declarations against interest is
based on necessity- the unavailability of the declarant
- and a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness.
"The circumstantial guaranty of reliability for declarations
against interest is the assumption that persons do not
make statements which are damaging to themselves
unless satisfied for good reason that they are true."
Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid 804.

Rule 804(B)(3) requires that the statement be against
the declarant's interest "at the time of its making." See
State v. Williams, 38 Ohio St.3d 346, ~48 n.6, 528 N.E.2d
910 (1988) ("[T]he statement does not meet the requirement
that it [has] been against Brown's pecuniary, proprietary
or penal interest at the time of its making."). Determining
whether the statement is, in fact, against interest requires
an examination of the context in which the statement was
made. See McCormick, Evidence§ 279 (3d ed.J984) ..
For example, a statement acknowledging a debt of $500
would, under most circumstances be a statement against
the declarant's pecuniary interest. If, however, the declarant made the statement while disputing a $1000 debt,
and the statement is offered to prove the debt was only
$500, the statement is not against interest. By its terms,
the rule requires the ·~against interest" standard to be
judged by a "reasonable man" viewpoint.

Firsthand knowledge
Although it is not explicitly mentioned in the rule, firsthand knowledge ori the part of the declarant is required.
See G. M. McKelvey Co. v. General Casualty Co., 166
Ohio St. 401, 404, 142 N.E.2d 854, 855-56 (1957)
("declarant had peculiar means of knowing the facts
which he stated"); Latham v. Clark, 120 Ohio St. 559, 166
N.E. 68!:) (1929).

The declaration against interest exception has been
the subject of constitutional attack. In Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410.U.S. 284 (1973), the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the exclusion of declarations against penal
interest offered by a criminal defendant for the purpose
of exculpation was a violation of due process. See also
Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979). It should be noted
'
that the declarant in Chambers was not unavailable.
Thus, in criminal cases the applicability of Rule 804(B)(3)
is affected by constitutional considerations. See generally 4 Louisell & Mueller, Federal Evidence§ 489 (1980).

Against interest requirement
The rule provides that the statement must have been
"so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or
criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him
against another, that a reasonable man in his position
would not have made the statement unless he believed it
to be true." As proposed by the U.S. Supreme Court, the
federal rule also permitted the admissibility of declara-
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admitting guilt and implicating another person, made
while in custody, may well be motivated by a desire to
curry favor with the authorities and hence fail to qualify
as against interest ... On the other hand, the same words
spoken under different circumstances, e.g., to an
acquaintance, would have no difficulty in qualifying. The
rule does not purport to deal with questions of the right of
confrontation."
See also State v. Liberatore, 69 Ohio St.2d 583, 587,
433 N.E.2d 561 (1982) (Declarant's statements made to
FBI agents in an effort to be accepted into the witness
protection program were not against his interest, but for
his interest); Neigbours v. State, 121 Ohio St. 525, 169
N.E. 839 (1930).

Corroboration requirement
The rule provides that a "statement tending to expose
the declarant to criminal liability, whether offered to
exculpate or inculpate the accused, is not admissible
unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the
trustworthiness of the statement." The use of the word
"accused" indicates that the corroboration requirement
was intended to apply only in criminal cases.
In contrast to the Ohio rule, Federal Rule 804(b)(3)
expressly requires corroboration only when the statementis offered to exculpate the accused. The federal
cases, however, have applied the corroboration requirement to inculpatory statements. McCormick, Evidence§
279, at 826 (3d ed.1984). The corroboration requirement
was explained by the federal drafters as follows:
The refusal of the common law to concede the
adequacy of a penal interest was no doubt indefensible in logic, ... but one senses in the decisions a
distrust of evidence of confessions by third persons
offered to exculpate the accused arising from suspicions of fabrication either of the fact of the making of
the confession or in its contents, enhanced in either
instance by the required unavailability of the declarant.
Nevertheless, an increasing amount of decisional law
recognizes exposure to punishment for crime as a
sufficient stake ... The requirement of corroboration is
included in the rule in order to effect an accommodation between these competing considerations ... The
requirement of corroboration should be construed in
such a manner as to effectuate its purpose of circumventing fabrication. Advisory Committee's Note, Fed.
R. Evid. 804.
The Ohio Staff Note makes the following observation:
Note that the language is "corroborating circumstances"
not "corroborating evidence." See also State v. Saunders,
23 Ohio App.3d 69, 73, 491 N.E.2d 313 (1984) ("[A) bare
showing of some extent of corroboration is not enough.").
The Ohio rule also requires corroboration of statements
inculpating the accused- for example, a statement by
an accomplice that he and the accused committed a
crime. The corroboration requirement was added
because such statements are often self-serving, and
their admission raises confrontation issues. See United
States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978). A draft of
the Federal Rules explicitly excluded such statements.
"This exception does not include a statement or confession offered against the accused in a criminal case,
made by a codefendant or other person implicating both
himself and the accused." 51 F.R.D. 439 (1971) (revised
draft). This provision was reinserted by the House Judiciary Committee. See H.R. Rep. No. 650, 93d Gong., 1st
Sess. (1973), reprinted in [1974) U.S. Code Gong. & Ad.
News 7075, 7090. It was subsequently deleted by the
Senate Judiciary Committee because that Committee
believed it unnecessary. SeeS. Rep. No. 1277, 93d
Gong., 2d Sess, reprinted in [1974) U.S. Code Gong. & Ad.
News 7051, 7068.
Although Federal Rule 804 as adopted allows the
introduction of statements inculpating the accused, the
Advisory Committee's Note to the rule recognizes that
such statements may not always be reliable: "Whether a
statement is in fact against interest must be determined
from the circumstances of each case. Thus, a statement

RESIDUAL EXCEPTION
Federal Rule 804(b) (5) recognizes a residual or catchall exception, which under certain circumstances permits
the admission of hearsay statements that do not fall within the scope of the exceptions enumerated in Federal
Rule 804. This_ provision was not adopted in Ohio. Thus a
case•such as Erion v. Timken Co., 52 Ohio App.2d 123,
368 N.E.2d 312 (1976), which adopted an ad hoc
approach to hearsay exceptions, is no longer controlling.
See State v. Fowler, 27 Ohio App.3d 149, 153, 27 OBR
182, 500 N.E.2d 390 (Cuyahoga 1985) ("[T]he Ohio rules
contain neither of the 'catch-all' exceptions ...").
DOUBLE HEARSAY
Rule 805 governs the admissibility of multiple hearsay.
The rule permits the admission of hearsay within hearsay
if each part of the hearsay chain falls within an exception.
Multiple hearsay problems most frequently arise in
connection with public records, Rule 803(8), and business records, Rule 803(6), especially hospital records.
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 805
contains the following explanation:
On principle it scarcely seems open to doubt that the
hearsay rule should not call for exclusion of a hearsay
statement which includes a further hearsay statement
when both conform to the requirements of a hearsay
exception. Thus a hospital record might contain an
entry of the patient's age based on information furnished
by his wife. The hospital record would qualify as a
regular entry except that the person who furnished the
information was not acting In the routine of the business. However, her statement independently qualifies
as a statement of pedigree (if she is unavailable) or as
a statement made for purposes of diagnosis or treatment,
and hence each link in the chain falls under sufficient
assurances. Or, further to illustrate, a dying declaration
may incorporate a declaration against interest by
another declarant ...
The Staff Note cites as an example of double hearsay a
case involving a hospital record which contains a statement
by a party. According to the Note, the record is admissible
because the hospital record qualifies as a business
record, Rule 803(6), and the statement of the party
qualifies as an admission of a party-opponent, Rule
801(D)(2)(a). Although the Staff Note's conclusion that
the record is admissible is correct, its analysis is not.
Admissions of party-opponents, by definition, are not
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States v. Lawson, 608 F.2d 1129, (6th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1129 (1980).

hearsay. Thus, the particular exa.m.ple set out in the Staff
Note does not present a "double hearsay" problem.
The Rule is consistent with prior Ohio law. In Westinghouse Electric Corp v. Dolly Madison Leasing & Furniture
Corp., 42 Ohio St.2d 122, 326 N.E.2d 651 (1975), the
Supreme Court in considering the admissibility of statements contained in an official record, stated: "This statute
[RC 2317.42] allows the admission of official records,
although these records may constitute hearsay, insofar
as they consist of facts recorded by public officials who
are not present as witnesses. However, the statute does
not render admissible statements contained in official
reports, where such statements are themselves hearsay."
/d. at 130. See also Green v. Cleveland, 150 Ohio St. 441,
83 N.E.2d 63 (1948); Schmitt v. Doehler Die Casting Co.,
143 Ohio St. 421, 55 N .E.2d 644 (1944); Hytha v.
Schwendeman, 40 Ohio App.2d 478, 484, 320 N.E.2d
312, 317 (1974) (" 'hearsay on tiearsay,' in the absence of
other exceptions to the general hearsay rule is not admissible, even in view of the business records as evidence
statute."); Ohio Credit Corp v. Brigham, 25 Ohio Misc.
241, 266 N.E.2d 867 (Muni. 1970).
.,,

Inconsistent statements
The second sentence of Rule 806 establishes a
special rule for impeachment by evidence of inconsistent
statements: "Evidence of a statement or conduct by the
declarant at any time, inconsistent with his hearsay statement, is not subject to any requirement that he may have
been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain." Hence,
Rule 613(8), which requires that a witness be provided
with an opportunity to explain or deny an inconsistent
statement before extrinsic evidence of that statement is
admissible, does not extend to the impeachment of hearsay declarants. For example, inconsistent statements
made subsequent to the hearsay statement are admissible. The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 806
provides the following explanation for this rule:
The declarant of a hearsay statement which is admitted in evidence is in effect a witness. His credibility
should in fairness be subject to impeachment and
support as though he had iri fact testified. See Rules
608 and 609. There are, however, some special
aspects of the impeaching of a hearsay declarant
which require consideration. These specia·l aspects
center upon impeachment by inconsistent statement,
arise from factual differences which exist between the
use of hearsay and an actual witness and also
between various kinds of hearsay, and involve the
question of applying to declarants the general rule
disallowing evidence of an inconsistent statement to
impeach a witness unless he is afforded an opportunity to deny or explain. See Rule 613(b).
The principal difference between using hearsay and
an actual witness is that the inconsistent statement will
in the case of the witness almost inevitably of necessity in the nature of things be a prior statement, which is
is entirely possible and feasible to call to his attention,
while in the case of hearsay the inconsistent statement
may well be a subsequent one, which practically
precludes calling it to the attention of the declarant.
The result of insisting upon observation of this impossible requirement in the hearsay situation is to deny
the opponent, already barred from cross-examination,
any benefit of this important technique of
impeachment ...
The few Ohio cases that have addressed this issue
appear to be divided. In an early case, Runyan v. Price,
15 Ohio St. 1 (1864), the Supreme Court held that
impeachment by means of an inconsistent statement
always requires that the declarant be afforded an opportunity to deny or explain the statement. In contrast, the
court in State v. Earley, 49 Ohio App.2d 377, 361 N.E.2d
254 (1975), held that an accused had a due process right
to introduce evidence impeaching the credibility of a
declarant whose preliminary hearing testimony had been
admitted at trial.

IMPEACHMENT OF DECLARANTS
Rule 806 governs the admissibility of evidence relating
to the credibility of hearsay declarants and persons who
make statements admitted pursuant to Rule 801(D)(2)(c)
(authorized admissions), Rule 801(D)(2)(d) (servant and
agent admissions), and Rule 801(0)(2)(3) (co-conspirator
admissions). The rule also provides that if a party against
whom a hearsay statement is admitted calls the declarant
as a witness, that party may examine the declarant "as
if under-cross-examination.'' This provision provides an
automatic exception to Rule 611(C), which generally
prohibits the use of leading questions on direct
examination.
Rule 806 generally permits hearsay declarants and
persons making representative admissions under Rule
801(0)(2) to be impeached and rehabilitated to the same
extent as witnesses who testify at trial. See Rule 607
(impeachment of own witness); Rule 608(A) (impeachment by opinion and reputation evidence of character for
truthfulness); Rule 608(B)(impeachment by evidence of
specific acts of conduct relevant to character for truthfulness); Rule 609 (impeachment by evidence of pri!Jr convictions); Rule 613 (impeachment by prior inconsistent
statements).
Rule 806 may be a trap for a defense counsel in a
criminal case. If an accused's hearsay statements are
elicited by the defensecounsel through another witness,
Rule 806 applies and the defendant may be impeached
even though he never testified. See United States v.
Noble, 754 F.2d 1324, 1330-31 (7th Cir.1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 818 (1985) (impeachment by prior
conviction); United States v. Bovain, 708 F.2d 606, 613
(11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 898 (1983); United
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